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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah
Code Annotated (1996), and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1.

The questions whether the services agreement had been

modified and whether Cook breached the modified Services Agreement were properly
submitted to the jury as issues of fact.
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether the Services Agreement in this case
could be orally modified is a question of law with no deference given to the trial court's
ruling. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). If the Court determines
that the Agreement could be orally modified, the issue of whether it was modified is a
question of fact. See Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C. J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App.
91 ^J 27, 977 P.2d 541. "Findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly
eiToneous[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Issue 2.

The attorney fees provision of the modified Services

Agreement formed a proper basis for the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC.
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether the attorney fees provision
contained in the modified Services Agreement allowed an award of attorney fees to
RTNC is a question of law, again subject to the correctness standard with no deference to
the trail court's ruling. See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256.
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Issue 3.

Were the trial court's Findings of Fact made in conjunction

with its award of attorney fees to RTNC clearly erroneous?
Standard of Appellate Review: What standard of appellate review applies
to a trial court's ruling is a question of law. See State v. Pemu 869 P.2d 932, 936-939
(Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed on appeal according to a
'clearly erroneous' standard. See In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 977-978
(Utah 1996). Under the 'clearly erroneous' standard, Cook was required to: (i) marshal
all of the evidence which supports the trial court's findings; and (ii) demonstrate that the
trial court's findings were "clearly erroneous in light of the great weight of the evidence"
or otherwise persuade this Court such that it was "definitely and firmly convinced that a
mistake has been made." Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d at 977. Whether or not Cook met this
burden is a question of law. See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936-939.
Issue 4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney

fees to RTNC?
Standaird of Appellate Review: A trial court necessarily has broad
discretion in awarding attorney fees and will not be overturned unless it abuses that
discretion.

See Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah

1996). This broad discretion is in deference to the fact that the trial court is in a better
position to judge the factors relevant to such an award. See id.
A trial court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the measure of discretion
granted it by law or legal principles. See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936-939. To demonstrate an
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"abuse of discretion," Cook must show that there was "no reasonable basis" for the trial
court's decision, see Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah
1993), or that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious" see Kunzler v. O'Dell 855
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Whether Cook has made such a showing is a
question of law. See id; Crookston. 860 P.2d at 938.
Issue 5.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Cook was not a prevailing

party for purposes of awarding attorney fees?
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether a party is a prevailing party and
entitled to attorney fees under a contract or statute is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. See Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case: Course of Proceedings: Disposition Below
This action arises out of the failure of Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook
for Congress Committee (hereinafter collectively "Cook") to pay the R.T. Nielson Co.
("RTNC") for services rendered and expenses incurred on behalf of Cook and his 1996
congressional campaign.
The parties entered into a written Services Agreement in March 1996. The
Agreement required RTNC to provide full campaign services to Cook during the
convention cycle of the 1996 campaign, but only limited services during the primary and
general election cycles of the campaign. The parties thereafter orally modified their
-3-

Agreement on two occasions, once as the campaign was moving into the primary election
cycle, and again when it was moving into the general election cycle. Each time, Cook
asked RTNC to provide full services to his campaign, rather than the limited service for
which Cook had originally contracted.
RTNC provided all of the services for which Cook had contracted under the
parties' modified Agreement and, due in large measure to its efforts, Cook won elective
public office for the first time ever after six tries. After Cook's victory in the November
1996 General Election, RTNC's office and personnel served as Cook's transition office in
Utah as he prepared to enter Congress in 1997. RTNC regularly invoiced Cook for its
services and expenses throughout 1996. Cook, who directed payments to specific
invoices, made at least some payment on all of the invoices which he would later contest.
Following his election to office, Cook refused to pay the $194,000 balance
owed on outstanding invoices and claimed that RTNC owed him monies. Suit was filed
by RTNC in January 1997. Before Cook filed his responsive pleading, RTNC voluntarily
dismissed its lawsuit and the matter was submitted to mediation before Paul Felt. The
Felt mediation failed and suit was again filed by RTNC in July 1997. In his responsive
pleading, Cook denied that the parties had orally modified their contract and
counterclaimed against RTNC and its principal, Ronald Nielson, seeking damages or setoffs in excess of $290,000.
In early 1999, Cook replaced his counsel A court-ordered mediation
before Judge David Roth (Ret.) in August 1999 failed. Prior to trial, RTNC obtained
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summary judgment as to three of Cook's nine counterclaims, and defeated a motion for
partial summary judgment filed by Cook.
The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The jury found that Cook and
RTNC had modified their contract as alleged by RTNC and that Cook had breached that
modified contract, damaging RTNC in the approximate sum of $183,000. It also found
that Cook had been unjustly enriched by RTNC's post-election services in the
approximate amount of $11,500. The jury also found that RTNC had in two instances
breached the parties' contract as alleged by Cook and that Cook had been damaged in the
approximate sum of $19,500, but it rejected Cook's remaining claims against RTNC and
Ron Nielson.
After trial, Cook again replaced his counsel. Both parties sought attorney
fees under the attorney fees provision of the modified Services Agreement. The trial
court ruled that RTNC was the only prevailing party in the litigation and awarded RTNC
$196,000 in attorney fees. Cook appealed from two judgments in this matter. The first
time from the trial court's May 31, 2000, interim judgment, later vacated, and a second
time from the trial court's final judgment dated December 20, 2000. Cook's only
docketing statement was filed in July 2000.
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Statement of Facts
Facts Related to Contract Modification Issues
1.

The jury received 45 jury instructions which were drafted, and

consented to, by counsel for RTNC and counsel for Cook. [R. 1968-2015]
2.

Of that set, Jury Instruction No. 22 provided:
FORM OF CONTRACT
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral.
[Addendum 1;R. 1990]

3.

In addition, Jury Instruction No. 24 provided:
ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by
oral or verbal agreement, even though the written contract may
prohibit oral or verbal modifications or require that modifications be
in writing. [Addendum 1; R.1992]

4.

Cook's counsel at no time objected to these jury instructions to the

trial court. [R. 2502, at pp. 134-140; R. 2503, at pp. 3-4, 81-93]
5.

Further, the jury received a special verdict form which was drafted,

and consented to, by counsel for RTNC and counsel for Cook. [Addendum 2; R. 19411947] This special verdict form contained, inter alia, the following special
interrogatories both of which were answered in the affirmative by the jury:
R.T. Nielson Co.'s Claims:
1.

Did the R.T. Nielson Co. and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for
Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as alleged by
the R.T. Nielson Co.?

2.

. . . If your answer to 1. Is "Yes", did Merrill Cook and the Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee breach their contract with the R.T.
-6-

Nielson Co. as modified by failing to pay the R.T. Nielson Co. as
agreed and/or violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
[Addendum 2; R. 1941-1942; R. 2503, at pp. 86-87]
6.

Cook's counsel at no time objected to any part of this special verdict

form to the trial court. [R. 2502, at pp. 134-140; R. 2503, at pp. 81-93]
7.

Other than the Fourteenth AfQrmative Defense in his Answer to

RTNC's Complaint, Cook did not raise the argument that the written Services Agreement
could not be orally modified as a matter of law and that no cause of action exists for
breach of the Services Agreement as orally modified in the trial court below. [R 73]
8.

The attorney fees provision contained in the Modified Services

Agreement provides:
Attorney Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation brought
to enforce any provision of this agreement shall be awarded
its costs and attorney fees.
See Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, at ^ 14.
Facts Related to RTNC Attorney Fees Award
9.

The trial court entered an interim, non-final judgment in favor of

RTNC on May 31, 2000, but vacated that judgment on August 8, 2000. [R. 2226-2228]
10.

Cook appealed from the May 31, 2000 judgment [R. 2354-2355] and

filed a docketing statement on July 2000. The docketing statement did not list the trial
court's award of attorney fees to RTNC as an issue presented on appeal.
11.

On December 22, 2000, the trial court entered final judgment for

RTNC. [No Record Reference]
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12.
judgment.

On January 5, 2001, Cook appealed the December 22, 2000

[No Record Reference]
13.

Also on January 5, 2001, Cook filed in this Court a Motion to

Consolidate Appeals [No Record Reference] and therein stated:
[G]iven that this appeal began last June, the lower court's December 20,
2000, judgment is similar to the earlier judgment from which judgment is
taken, [fii] and the docketing statement and other preparatory action
have been completed, Appellants request that the briefing schedule for the
consolidated appeal remain the same . . .
[fii] As noted above, the only substantive difference was that the lower
court awarded Appellee an award of approximately $195,000 in attorney
fees.
Facts Related to Marshaling of Evidence
f.

In awarding attorney fees to RTNC, the trial court made, inter alia,

the following express findings of fact [Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law re Attorneys Fees (hereinafter "Findings")]:
9.
The bulk of RTNCs claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out
of the election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total
relevant time period. Further, approximately $182,000 of RTNC s total
claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered and expenses
incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to
Cook's counterclaims.

10. There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various
claims each party asserted against the other. Specifically:
a.
RTNCs alternative claims for election phase services
and expenses (i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim
and its noncompensable unjust enrichment and account stated
claims) were based upon the same facts (e.g., conversations,
-8-

services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes,
and other evidence from the election phase).
b.
Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his
noncompensable claims regarding the election phase were
based on these same facts.
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable
and noncompensable election phase claims required proof of what
transpired during the election phase. * * *
^r

^n ^r

^r

*r

^P

12. The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent
developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and
expenses incurred during the election phase (i.e., its compensable breach of
contract claim and its overlapping but noncompensable alternative unjust
enrichment and other claims).
* * * * * *

15, Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claimspecific (e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural
matters and motions).

21. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs,
including specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives.
Specifically, it:
* * *

e.
articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating
and allocating RTNC's attorney fees between compensable and
noncompensable claims; and,
f.
reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorney fees
between compensable and noncompensable claims.
^h ^P *r

^r
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^r ^P

22. Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit
of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNC's
evidence of: (i) the nature, reasonableness, and necessity of the work
actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any member of RTNC's
legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the
reasonableness of the fees sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates
with those customarily charged for similar legal services in this area.
* * * * * *

26. Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees
and Costs and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated,
high-profile, and hotly-contested litigation, the legal work performed by
RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this
matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel
through trial and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's
own fee application, comparable to the hours and fees of Cook's counsel
through trial.
[Addendum 4 (emphasis added)]
* * * * * *

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE QUESTIONS WHETHER THE SERVICES AGREEMENT HAD
BEEN MODIFIED AND WHETHER COOK BREACHED THE MODIFIED
SERVICES AGREEMENT WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY AS ISSUES OF FACT.
In his first argument on appeal, Cook asserts that the "legal question"

whether the Services Agreement was orally modified should not have been submitted to
the jury since the Services Agreement could not be orally modified as a matter of law.
Cook then purports the jury did not find that Cook breached the written Services
Agreement. Finally, Cook argues that RTNC's action should be dismissed because it did
not submit the question of breach of a separate oral agreement to the jury. Cook's
-10-

arguments are entirely without merit for the following reasons: (1) Cook did not preserve
the issue whether the Services Agreement could be orally modified as a matter of law for
appeal because Cook did not adequately raise this issue with the trial court. (2) Utah law
is well-settled that written agreements can be orally modified even if the written
agreement contains a provision to the contrary. The question therefore was properly
submitted to the jury. (3) Utah law also is well-settled that the question whether a written
agreement was orally modified is a factual, not a legal, question. (4) Cook failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's findings that the written Services Agreement
was modified and that the modified Services Agreement was breached were clearly
erroneous. The jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment should therefore be affirmed.
H.

THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE MODIFIED
SERVICES AGREEMENT FORMED A PROPER BASIS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S ATTORNEY FEES AWARD TO RTNC.
In his second argument, Cook repeats his argument that the Services

Agreement could not be modified as a matter of law, again claims there was no finding
that Cook breached the written agreement or any of its terms, and boldly asserts that
"only Cook prevailed on any claims under the written agreement." Cook also argues that
the attorney fees award was improper because Utah law does not allow attorney fees for a
breach of an oral obligation. These allegations are contrary to law and are directly
contradicted by the record on appeal. The jury did find that Cook breached his contract
with the R.T. Nielson Co. "as modified." Further, Cook's construction of a modified
agreement as consisting of the original agreement and the modifications as separate
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entities is artificial, illogical, and not supported by Utah law. A "modification" of a
contract is a change in one or more respects which introduces new elements into the
details of the contract, cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect
undisturbed. Under Utah law, the written attorney fees provision as contained in the
modified Services Agreement applied to all provisions in that modified agreement
regardless of whether such provisions were reduced to writing. RTNC brought this
litigation to enforce provisions of the modified Services Agreement, prevailed in its quest,
and is entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement. The trial court's award of attorney
fees to RTNC should therefore be upheld.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO RTNC WAS A
VALID EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION.
Cook's appeal from the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC is not

properly before the Court. Cook filed his only docketing statement in this matter in July
2000 following entry of a nonfinal judgment. In January 2000, Cook appealed the trial
court's only final judgment in this matter and moved to consolidate his two appeals.
After acknowledging that the trial court had awarded RTNC attorney fees since his
original docketing statement had been filed, Cook ratified his July 2000 docketing
statement as being complete. That docketing statement did not identify the fee award to
RTNC as an issue on appeal. Cook's failure to file a complete docketing statement at the
appropriate time prejudiced RTNC by denying it (and this Court) from summarily
disposing of issues raised by Cook. Cook's appeal regarding the fee award to RTNC
should be dismissed.
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RTNC was clearly the prevailing party in this matter and the only party
entitled to recover attorney fees. Expressed in terms of the damages sought by both sides
on compensable claims, RTNC prevailed on more than 95% of those claims.
RTNC's fee application contained all evidence required by rule or case law
and otherwise fully comported with applicable rules, case law, and the trial court's
directives. RTNC was not required under Utah law or by the trial court to submit the
additional evidence demanded by Cook. The trial court's decision not to request such
information, even if desirable, was within its broad discretion or was harmless error. Nor
was RTNC's fee award confined to its fee agreement with counsel.
Cook's appeal of the fee award to RTNC challenges express findings of fact
by the trial court. On appeal, Cook seeks to apply an 'abuse of discretion' standard to
thesefindings,when the correct appellate standard of review is a 'clearly erroneous'
standard. Cook fails to meet his burden under this latter standard by, inter alia, failing to
marshal the evidence supporting these findings and failing to demonstrate, based on this
evidence, that the trial court clearly erred in making its findings.
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Attorneys
Fees and Order Re Attorneys Fees are firmly grounded in the evidence submitted and in
the law. As such, the trial court did not clearly err in its factual findings, did not err in its
interpretation of applicable law, and did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding
attorney fees to RTNC.
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IV.

COOK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY FEES.
The basis for awarding attorney fees was the parties' Modified Services

Agreement, which provided for recovery of fees to the prevailing party. RTNC was the
prevailing party in this litigation. In terms of damages or set-offs sought by both parties,
RTNC prevailed on 96% of the parties compensable claims, with the remaining 4%
coming as a set-off against RTNC's $194,000 verdict.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE QUESTIONS WHETHER THE SERVICES AGREEMENT HAD
BEEN MODIFIED AND WHETHER COOK BREACHED THE MODIFIED
AGREEMENT WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS
ISSUES OF FACT.
A.

Cook's Argument That No Cause of Action Exists in this Case for
Breach of an Oral Modification to a Contract Is Not Reviewable by this
Court.
On appeal, Cook argues for the first time that the services agreement could

not be modified as a matter of law since the Services Agreement included a clause that
the contract could only be modified in writing. [Cook Brief pp. 1, 13, 15-25] Contrary to
Cook's assertions, Cook did not preserve this issue in the court below. Failure to raise an
issue below precludes its consideration on appeal. See Ong Inf 1 (U.S.A.! Inc. v. 11th
Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (quotations omitted).
The issue presented on appeal by Cook was never orally presented to the
trial court, and the only place where this issue was even mentioned in the pleadings is the
Fourteenth Defense in his Answer and Counterclaim: "Any alleged oral contract between
plaintiff and defendants is void pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Services Agreement."
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[R. 73 J1 However, "the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings . . . is insufficient to
raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." LeBaron &
Assocs. v. Rebel Enterpr. Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Cook never filed
a dispositive motion based thereon, nor presented this argument verbally in the trial
court.2 Cook's argument that no cause of action exists in this case for breach of an orally
modified contract must be rejected and the trial court's judgment against Cook must be
affirmed. Accord, West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 887 P.2d 880, 882
n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider waiver and estoppel argument even though
raised as affirmative defense in Answer); see also James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

1

None of the remaining citations Cook provides in support of his argument
that this issue was preserved below are on point. [Cook Brief p. 1] R. 2494 pp. 83-84,
contains questions asked by counsel to a member of the jury venire on polling. R 20282040 contains Cook's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, Objection to RTNC's Motion
for Costs and Attorney Fees, and Request for Hearing with Substitute Counsel as well as
an Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of attorney L. Deland in Support of Motion for
Attorney Fees. R 2232-2242, in turn, contains Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to
RTNC's Application for Attorney's Fees. Finally, R. 2450-2460 contains Cook's
Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. All but one
of these arguments were raised after trial and all are inapposite.
2

At the trial court level, Cook instead argued that no (sufficient) evidence
existed that Cook had agreed to any oral modifications to the services agreement. [See,
e.g. R. 2503 pp. 44-45]
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B.

Cook Cannot Complain of Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form
That His Counsel Helped Create and To Which He Acquiesced.
Similarly, Cook asserts for the first time on appeal that the first question

contained in the Special Verdict form, "[d]id the RTNC and Merrill Cook and the Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as alleged by the R.T.
Nielson Co.?," [R. 1941] should not have been submitted to the jury. [Cook Brief p. 22]
However, counsel for Cook took part in the drafting of the Special Verdict form and did
not object to this Special Verdict form at trial. [R. 2502 at pp. 134-140; R. 2503 at pp. 34, 81-93] "A district court will not be put in error for a ruling or procedure in which the
appellant acquiesced or participated, or to which the appellant made no objection." State
ex. Rel. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund v. Berg. 927 P.2d 975, 983 (Mont. 1996). Cook "is
in no position to complain because [he] affirmatively participated in formulating
instructions - and a verdict form[.]" See Fogg v .National R.R. Passenger Corp., 585
A.2d 786, 790 n.6 (D.C. 1991).
Moreover, in his argument on appeal, Cook ignores the fact that the issue of
oral modifications to a written agreement was addressed extensively in the juiy
instructions in this case. [R. 1968-2015.] Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 22 provided:
FORM OF CONTRACT
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral.
[Addendum 1;R. 1990]
In addition, Jury Instruction No. 24 provided:
ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
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Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by oral or
verbal agreement, even though the written contract may prohibit oral or
verbal modifications or require that modifications be in writing.
[Addendum 1; R. 1992]
Cook's counsel participated in the drafting of these jury instructions, and at
trial did not object to any of these instructions, let alone the instructions on the issue of
oral modifications. "'Having approved the instructions as given and requested no others,
counsel should not be heard to complain that the court did not constitute itself counsel in
the cause, and submit other theories not urged by defendant just because the court may
think such theories of defense could have been urged/" State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229,
240 P.2d 504, 507 (1952) (quoting State v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354, 360
(1940)).3 "No principle of law is better settled than the rule that a litigant cannot sit
quietly by and chance a favorable verdict and thereafter assert error when he has helped
to create the error or nurtured it by his silence." McGuire v. W.A. Thompson Distrib.
Co., 30 Cal. Rptr.113, 121 (Cal. Ct. App.1963). Cook's objection to the special verdict
form asserted for the first time on appeal should therefore be dismissed outright.
C.

The Law in Utah Is Well-settled That a Written Contract Can Be
Orally Modified Even If the Contract Itself Contains a Provision to the
Contrary,

3

Only where the "instructions are palpably erroneous to such an extent that
they would, if followed by the jury, prevent a fair or proper determination of the issues"
could an issue possibly be deemed preserved for appeal without an objection below. See
id. This situation clearly is not present here. All instructions given to the jury,
specifically on the issue of oral modifications to written agreements, were in accordance
with Utah law as was the special verdict form. See infra, at pp. 19-22.
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Even if this Court decides to consider Cook's argument that the issue of
whether the Services Agreement was orally modified should never have been submitted to
the jury, this Court should dismiss this argument as contrary to well-established Utah law.
Contrary to Cook's representation to this Court that the question of whether a contract
can be orally modified in the face of a contractual provision to the contrary is an issue of
first impression in Utah,4 this Court as early as 1960 recognized that "[i]t is a wellestablished rule of law that parties to a written contract may modify, waive, or make
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such freedom."
Davis v. Pavne & Day, Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337, 339 (1960) (citing Salzner v.
Jos. J. Snell Estate Corp.. 81 Utah 111, 16 P.2d 923, 925 (1932)).
In subsequent decisions, this Court has clearly indicated its unwavering
adherence to this principle. See e.g., Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co. Inc.. 610 P.2d
1267 (Utah 1980). In Prince. Prince brought suit for money owed based upon an oral
modification. Id. Tolman countered citing a clause in their written agreement which
stated that "any changes or modifications shall be in writing." Id Recognizing the
validity of the oral modification claim, this Court stated:
The first is the fundamental rule of review that it was the trial court's
prerogative to judge the credibility of the evidence and to find the facts ...
The second is the well-recognized rule that notwithstanding recitals in a
prior contract restricting changes or modification in its terms, the parties are

4

See Cook's Docketing Statement at p. 6: "This appeal... involves several
issues of first impression. Among these issues is the ability of the parties to orally
modify a written contract containing an express provision prohibiting oral modifications
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as free in appropriate circumstances to renegotiate new terms or to make
separate supplemental agreements as they were to make the contract in the
first place.
Id. at 1269 (citations omitted).
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's sua sponte
determination that a written contract had been orally modified. See Fisher v. Fishen 907
P.2d 1172, 1176-1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the law in Utah is well-settled
that a written contract can in proper circumstances be orally modified even if the contract
itself contains a provision to the contrary. Far from being an issue of first impression,
this principle is black letter law in the State of Utah.
Further, no good policy or other reasons exist to change the law on this
point and abandon such a well-settled principle of law. First, Cook's invocation of the
freedom to contract principle in support of his argument, [Cook Brief pp. 15-17] actually
supports the rule as it exists in Utah. "It is fundamental that where parties have rights
under an existing contract they have exactly the same power to renegotiate terms or to
waive such rights as they had to make the contract in the first place .. . notwithstanding
terms in that contract designed to hamper such freedom." Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d
205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963) (citations and quotations omitted).
Second, Cook's argument that oral modifications to a written agreement
proscribing oral modifications should not be allowed because parties should be held to
their agreements, [Cook Brief pp. 17, 23] fails. "There is nothing so sacrosanct about
having entered into one agreement that it will prevent the parties entering into any such
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change, modification, extension or addition to their arrangement for doing business with
each other that they may mutually agree." PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish CN
Chips, Inc.. 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (1972) (citing Davis. 348 P.2d at 340;
Chenev. 381 P.2d at 89 (1972)).5
Finally, contract modifications, written or oral, "are governed by the same
rules as to proof and enforceability as the original agreement."6 PLC Landscape Const..
502 P.2d at 563. "A valid modification of a contract.. . requires ca meeting of the minds
of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness.'" Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C.J.R.. 1999 UT App. 91, ^[26, 977
P.2d 541 (quoting Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah
1996)). Therefore, Cook's argument for rigidly enforcing provisions such as paragraph
15 of the Services Agreement in the face of an oral modification fails.
D.

Whether the Services Agreement Was Modified Is a Question of Fact.
Cook's argument that the question whether the services agreement at issue was

modified is a "legal question," [Cook Brief pp. 22-23] is without any basis. Utah case law
clearly provides that "[t]he question of whether an 'oral modification has been proven is
one for the trier of fact.'" Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp.. 1999 UT App. at ^[27
(quoting Dennett v. Kuenzli. 936 P.2d 219, 224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); Fair v. Red Lion

5

Ironically, the reason claims for oral modifications to written agreements
are enforced in the face of provisions to the contrary is to prevent one party from securing
performance under the modification only to escape his counter obligations by claiming
lack of formalities.
6

Cook's implication to the contrary [Cook Brief p. 23] is faulty.
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Inn, 920 P.2d 820, 825 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) aff'd, 943 P.2d 431 (Colo. 1997); Wollin v.
Walker. 830 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo. 1992)) (emphasis added). Consequently, Cook's
argument must be dismissed as a failed effort to transpose a factual question into a
purported legal question.7
E.

The Jury Properly Found That the Services Agreement Had Been
Modified and That Cook Had Breached the Modified Agreement.
Rather than addressing the evidence and the jury'sfindingsin this case

head-on, Cook posits on appeal that the written Services Agreement in his case could not
be modified as a matter of law and that the jury was not asked whether the parries entered
into separate, independent oral agreements. [Cook Brief p. 23] Cook then misinterprets
the jury's findings by arguing that the jury (1) did not find that Cook breached the written
Services Agreement, and (2) did not find that a separate oral agreement existed between
Cook and RTNC. [Cook Brief pp. 1-2, 10, 13-14, 20, 23-24] Consequently, Cook
asserts that this Court should dismiss RTNC's claims since it was RTNC's decision not to
submit the question whether an independent oral agreement existed to the jury. [Cook
Brief pp. 24-25]

7

The cases cited by Cook in support of his argument [Cook Brief p. 22] are
wholly inapposite. See Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.. 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973) and
Wirtz v. LaFitte. 326 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1964) where facts were undisputed and legal
question submitted to jury. Here, the facts were far from undisputed. The entire dispute
turned upon whether the Services Agreement had been modified and whether Cook
breached the agreement as modified. The jury answered both these factual questions in
the affirmative. [Addendum 2; R. 1941-1942]
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Cook's argument is entirely without merit. First, as discussed supra, the
premise for Cook's line of reasoning, i.e., that the Services Agreement could not be
modified as a matter of law is contrary to Utah law. Second, "[i]t is settled that 'the
parties to a contract' may modify 'all or any portion of that contract.'" Fisher, 907 P.2d
at 1177 (quoting Western Sur. Co. v. Murphy. 754 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)) (emphasis added); see also Rapp v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co.. 606 P.2d
1189, 1191 (Utah 1980). "A modification of a contract is a change in one or more
respects which introduces new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some
of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect undisturbed," Chicago College of
Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co.. 776 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
In Fisher, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's sua sponte
finding "that the parties narrowly modified the original escrow agreement" as to when
annual payments were due under the agreement, reasoning that "[t]he remaining terms
of the parties' agreement... remained governed by the original written escrow
agreement." Fisher. 907 P.2d at 1177. (emphasis added).
Here, the jury found that the services agreement had been orally modified,
and found that Cook breached the Services Agreement "as modified." [Addendum 2;
R. 2503 p. 87; R. 1941-1942]8 Thesefindingsare in accordance with Utah law, and are

The trial court shared this view of the jury's verdict [Findings at f 17]
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based on ample evidence.9 Under Utah law, this modified contract consisted of the
original written Services Agreement, which remained in effect, as well as certain new
elements which were introduced into the written Services Agreement through oral
modifications.10 Accordingly, Cook's argument that he was not found to have breached
the Service Agreement and that the jury did not find any additional agreement between
the parties is baseless.
F.

Cook in Any Event Waived His Right to Insist on Strict Compliance
with the Requirement That Modifications Only Be in Writing.
In this case, Cook has waived his right to insist upon strict compliance with

the provision requiring that any modification of that agreement be in writing. [Exh. 17P,
at U 15] Further, Cook is estopped from asserting any statute of frauds argument.11 Ample
9

E.g., Trial Exhibit 153P [Addendum 3] provided "an outline from the time
[RTNC] started invoicing [Cook] until the end of the convention [and providing] a
running balance." [R. 2495 p. 94,11. 23-24, p. 95,1. 1]. Exhibit 153P included invoice
number 96118 in the amount of $40,000.00, the fee included in the original written
Services Agreement. [R. 2495 p. 95,11. 13-16; Exh. 17P, at \ 4(b)]. Of this amount
included in the original Services Agreement, $2,086.00 remained unpaid. [R. 2495 p. 96,
11. 8-13, 18-20]. In addition, Exhibit 153P evidences moneys owed to RTNC based on
services rendered pursuant to the Modified Services Agreement. [R. 2495 pp. 161,1. 23 p. 164,1. 25].
10

These modifications are described in more detail in Jury Instruction No. 40.
[R. 2009-2010]
11

Cook makes passing reference to § 70A-2-209 of the Utah Code Ann.
[Cook Brief p. 20]. However, Utah's version of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
apply to this case since this case involves a contract for services, not for sale of "goods."
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-105(1) Furthermore, even if this statutory section would apply,
"Utah Code Ann. section 70A-2-209(4)... provides that an oral attempt to modify a
contract can operate as a waiver of section 209(2) 's requirement of written modification."
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (citing Durbano Metals. Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc.. 574 P.2d 1159, 1162
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evidence exists in the record that RTNC changed its position by executing its
performance of the Services Agreement as orally modified and, in fact, performed the
Modified Services Agreement in its entirety with Cook's knowledge and acquiescence.
[E.g., Trial Exhibit 153; Addendum 3]
[A] recognized and accepted exception to the statute of frauds provides[:]
* * *

[W]here there is evidence of part performance under the modified
agreement, and where it would be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate
the oral modification and seek enforcement of the written contract, the oral
agreement may be removed from the statute of frauds and enforced.
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 117712; see also White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983) ("[i]f
a party has changed his position by performing an oral modification so that it would be
inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim upon the original agreement... the
modified agreement should be held valid") (quotation omitted). Consequently, Cook is
barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel from insisting on appeal that any
modifications of the Services Agreement be in writing. Accord, Tolman, 610 P.2d at
1269; Lone Mountain Production Co. v. National Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 984 F.2d
1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992).

(Utah 1978)).
12

The Utah Court of Appeals further stated: "we note that just as a partial
modification of a written contract that is likewise in writing is enforceable, so is an oral
modification that the parties clearly relied upon and that one party performed in part."
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177 n.5.
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G.

Assuming Arguendo that Utah Law Does Not Recognize RTNC's
Breach of Modified Contract Claims, RTNC Asserted Alternative
Claims Requiring Trial on Remand.
Cook argues that RTNC has no viable claims against Cook because: (i)

Utah law does not recognize the breach of oral modification claims upon which Cook
claims RTNC obtained a verdict and; (ii) RTNC submitted no other claims to the jury.
[Cook Brief at pp. 24-25]13 Based upon these assumptions, Cook argues that the jury
verdict in favor of RTNC should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Cook, no
cause of action. This argument fails. RTNC's breach of modified contract theory was
not the only theory submitted to the jury regarding RTNC's election phase services.
RTNC also submitted its claims for these services to the jury under an unjust enrichment
theory. [Addendum 1; R. 1942 % 5]
Thus, even if Cook's assertion that RTNC's contract-based claims are
barred is correct, RTNC still has its alternative claim for unjust enrichment. Appellate
courts may affirm the trial court on any basis, including arguments not relied on by the
trial court. Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1249 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(citations omitted). The judgment of the trial court enforcing the jury's verdict must be
affirmed.

13

While Cook does not say so, it is clear that this argument is directed solely
at RTNC's claims for election phase services, as the only RTNC claim for post-election
services submitted to the jury was for unjust enrichment.
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H.

THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE MODIFIED
SERVICES AGREEMENT FORMED A PROPER BASIS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT'S ATTORNEY FEES AWARD TO RTNC.
A.

The Attorney Fees Award Was Proper Pursuant to the Modified
Services Agreement.
In arguing that the $195,800.93 attorney fees award to RTNC was

improper, Cook repeats his invalid argument that the Services Agreement could not be
modified as a matter of law [Cook Brief p. 25] and misrepresents the jury's findings by
claiming that "there was no finding that Cook breached the written agreement or any of
its terms." [Cook Brief p. 29; see also id, pp. 4, 14, 20, 23-24, 25] These assertions, as
well as Cook's allegation that "only Cook prevailed on any claims under the written
agreement," [Cook Brief pp. 1-2] are directly contradicted by the record on appeal.14 As
already discussed supra at p. 23, the jury found that "Cook breach[ed ] their contract with
the R.T. Nielson Co. as modified." [R. 1942 (emphasis added)] The attorney fees
provision contained in the Modified Services Agreement provides:
Attorney Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce
any provision of this agreement shall be awarded its costs and attorney
fees.
[Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, at 1f 14 (emphasis added)]

14

The record does contain evidence that Cook violated the original written
Service Agreement. Exhibit 153P [Addendum 3] included invoice number 96118 in the
amount of $40,000.00, the fee included in the original written Services Agreement.
[R. 2495 p. 95,11. 13-16; Exh. 17P, at f 4(b)]. Of this amount included in the original
Services Agreement, $2,086.00 remained unpaid. [R. 2495 p. 96,11. 8-13, 18-20] This
unpaid balance was part of RTNC s successful breach of contract claims in this action.
See id.
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RTNC brought this litigation to enforce provisions of the Modified Services
Agreement, prevailed in its quest, and is entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement.
B.

The Attorney Fees Award Was Proper under Utah Law.
Cook next argues that the attorney fees award was improper because Utah

law does not allow attorney fees for a breach of an oral obligation. [Cook Brief p. 28]
However, Cook's construction of a modified agreement as consisting of the original
agreement and the modifications as separate entities is artificial, illogical, and not
supported by Utah law.15 In Lemley v. Allen. 659 P.2d 262 (Mont. 1983), the trial court
found "that the parties had orally modified the original lease [agreement]... by an
executed oral agreement." Id. at 265. Based on these findings, the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that "[t]herefore the original lease was modified (but still in effect)."
Id. (emphasis added). As in our case, the appellant in Lemley challenged the trial court's
award of attorney fees as not warranted by the attorney fees provision contained in the
original written agreement. However, the Montana Supreme Court found this challenge
to be "totally without merit," reasoning: "A request for attorney fees was contained in
[appellee's] answer. [Appellee] prevailed in her defense. Obviously, the award of fees
was proper." Id. (emphasis added). Utah case law clearly supports the proposition that

15

It is settled that the parties to a contract may modify all or any portion of
that contract. A "modification" of a contract is a change in one or more respects which
introduces new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some of them, but leaves
the general purpose and effect undisturbed. See supra, p. 24.
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an attorney fees provision contained in the Modified Services Agreement forms a proper
basis for the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC. See Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177.
Cook cites Section 78-27-56.5 of the Utah Code Annotated in support of his
strained argument that the contractual provision that is breached must be contained in a
written contract before attorney fees can be awarded. [Cook Brief p. 28] However,
Section 78-27-56.5 provides that "[a] court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1986). RTNC brought its action based
on the Modified Services Agreement, prevailed, and is entitled to attorney fees under the
attorney fees provision contained in the original written Services Agreement.16
Thus, under Utah law, the attorney fees provision as contained in the
written Services Agreement, as orally modified, applied to all provisions in that modified
agreement regardless of whether such provisions were reduced to writing. See generally
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177-1179. Cook's violations of the Modified Services Agreement
clearly entitled RTNC to an award of attorney fees under Utah law and the trial court's
award of attorney fees to RTNC as the prevailing party should therefore be upheld. In
addition, RTNC respectfully requests this Court to grant additional attorney fees to

16

Petersen v. Hodges. 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951), which Cook argues
is "strikingly similar" to the present action," [Cook Brief p. 28] is not at all comparable
and in any event does not support Cook's construction of Utah law. While the court
declined to impose attorney fees, Petersen involved a written lease agreement pertaining
to one parcel of land and a separate and distinct oral lease agreement pertaining to a
different parcel. Id. at 181. Moreover, the parties were found to have rescinded the oral
lease agreement. Id. at 182.
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RTNC for fees incurred in defending this appeal before this Court based upon the same
attorney fees provision included in the Modified Services Agreement. Accord
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-409 (Utah
1980).
III.

COOK'S CHALLENGE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FEE AWARD TO
RTNC IS WITHOUT MERIT.
A.

Cook's Appeal of the Fee Award Is Not Properly Before the Court And
Must Be Dismissed.
Cook's appeal of the trial court's award of RTNC's attorney fees is barred

by reason of Cook's failure to include this issue in his docketing statement. Rule
9(c)(2)(C)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure required Cook to list in his
docketing statement "[t]he issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case

" Utah R. App. P. 9(c)(2)(C)(5). Docketing statements

must fully comply with Rule 9 and, if they do not, the appeal or affected portion thereof
may be dismissed. Brooks v. Department of Employment Sec.» 736 P.2d 241, 241 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam).
Cook's docketing statement was filed following the trial court's May 31,
2000 entry of anonfinal interim judgment in favor of RTNC for principal and interest
only, [R. 2226-2228] As the judgment was not final, no appeal could be taken from it.
See A.J. Mackav Co. v. Okland Construction Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991).
Because Cook had no right of appeal when he filed his docketing statement in July 2000,
the docketing statement did not trigger RTNC's right to seek summary disposition as
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contemplated by Rule 10. For this reason, RTNC did not seek summary disposition of
any of the issues listed in Cook's docketing statement.
Cook's docketing statement listed seven issues for appeal. The award of
attorney fees to RTNC was not among the issues listed. At this juncture, the trial court
had ruled that RTNC was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees, but
had not awarded any fees to RTNC.
The non-final judgment from which Cook initially appealed was
subsequently vacated by the trial court. [R. 2356-2357] The trial court thereafter entered
final Judgment in favor of RTNC on December 22, 2000. [No Record Reference] On
January 5, 2001, Cook filed a Notice of Appeal as to this judgment. [Id] He did not
however, file a docketing statement as to this, his only proper appeal. Instead, he filed a
Motion for Consolidation of Appeals and, after specifically noting that the only material
difference between the trial court's interim and final judgments was the award of attorney
fees to RTNC, ratified his original docketing statement:
[T]his appeal began last June, the lower court's December 20, 2000,
judgment is similar to the earlier judgment from which the appeal was
taken, and the docketing statement and other preparatory action have
been completed.
[Id] By this ratification, Cook represented to this Court and RTNC that the only issues
to be presented on the appeal were those listed in the docketing statement.
Cook's failure to timely and properly file a docketing statement in
compliance with Rule 9 has prejudiced RTNC. One of the express purposes of a
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docketing statement is use by the appellate court "in making summary dispositions when
appropriate . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 9(b). In order for this purpose to be fulfilled, issues
which may be appropriate for summary disposition must be identified for the appellate
court by the appellee through a motion for summary disposition. In order for the appellee
to do this, all issues presented by the appeal must be identified in the docketing statement.
Absent a properly filed docketing statement that triggers its right to seek summary
disposition, the appellee is not required to consider let alone file a motion for summary
disposition.
Had Cook filed a docketing statement as required by Rule 9, RTNC would
have sought summary disposition as to all of Points 1, 2, and/or 4 of Cook's Arguments
on appeal. As demonstrated, infra, summary disposition was warranted on some or all of
these issues.
Cook's appeal regarding the RTNC attorney fees award must therefore be
dismissed, lest Cook benefit twice from his failure to comply with Rule 9; to wit: first by
denying RTNC an opportunity to seek summary disposition of issues contained in an
improperly filed docketing statement, and second, presenting issues on appeal not listed
in any docketing statement.
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B.

Cook's Evidentiary Challenges to the Fee Award Are Without Merit.
1.

RTNC Was Not Required To Prove that the Fees It Seeks Were
Incurred, Owed, or Paid, or to Provide "Contemporaneous Billing
Information.

Cook contends that the trial court was required to have RTNC put on
evidence that the attorney fees RTNC was seeking were actually incurred, paid, or are
owed. [Cook Brief pp. 33-34] Utah law does not impose such a requirement. Cf,
Softsolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 2000 UT 46, % 47-56, 1 P.3d 1095;
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996);
Smith v. Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992).17
Cook cites Softsolutions for the general proposition that "[an] award of fees
[is] limited to [the] amount actually paid or for which [the prevailing] party is obligated."
[Cook Brief p. 33] This proposition can not be found in Softsolutions. In Softsolutions.
the prevailing party (B YU) had been represented in litigation by in-house counsel and
was seeking recovery of its attorney fees. Isolating these specific circumstances, this
Court said that "[f]ees for in-house counsel are limited to consideration actually paid or
for which the party is obligated . . . ." Softsolutions. 2000 UT 46 at ^[52 (emphasis

17

Cook also cites these cases for the proposition that if RTNC has a
contingent fee agreement with its counsel, RTNC's fee recovery "would be limited to that
contingency." [Cook Brief p. 34, n.8] This interpretation of these cases is imaginative at
best, as none of these case dealt with a contingent fee arrangement. Further, as
demonstrated, infra, the fee arrangement between the prevailing party and its counsel
may, but need not, be considered in making a fee award and is in any event not
determinative.
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added). Here, RTNC was not represented by in-house counsel and Softsolutions is
inapposite.
Cook cites Jones Waldo for the general proposition that "[there can be] no
award of fees where the party seeking fees did not actually pay or become liable for legal
representation and thus did not incur attorney's fees." [Cook Brief p. 33] This
proposition cannot be found in Jones Waldo. In Jones Waldo, a law firm had
successfully represented itself in a fee dispute where the fee agreement provided for
attorney fees to the prevailing party. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the law
firm's fee application, this Court held that "plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees in its
pro se collection action" against its client. See Jones Waldo. 923 P.2d at 1375. Here,
RTNC was not representing itselfpro se and Jones Waldo is inapposite.
Cook cites Batchelor for the same proposition as Jones Waldo. [Cook Brief
p. 33] Batchelor presented a situation materially identical to Jones Waldo, with the only
difference being that the pro se litigant in Batchelor was an attorney seeking to recover
attorney fees pursuant to statute. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the fee
application, this Court stated that "[i]t is the general rule that pro se litigants should not
recover attorney fees in successful litigation." Batchelor. 832 P.2d at 473. Again, RTNC
was not a pro se litigant and Batchelor is inapposite.
Simply stated, Cook has not cited and cannot cite any authority that
requires a prevailing party represented by independent counsel to submit evidence that
the fees sought have been incurred, paid, or are owed by that party.
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Cook also claims that the trial court was required to have RTNC put
"contemporaneous billing information" into evidence. [See Cook Brief pp. 31-40] Cook
cites Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, % 14-15 978 P.2d 470, cert.
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999) for this proposition. The role, if any, that the
"contemporaneous billing records" played in Brown is unclear. What is clear is that these
records were at best of secondary importance to the Court of Appeals:
The evidence that Richards presented was sufficient to meet the allocation
instructions we set on remand .... Richards, through his fee application,
properly set out the time and fees expended for successful claims for
which there was an entitlement to attorney fees. Richards went through
all billing records and eliminated fees for all non-recoverable fees and
articulated this process for the trial court in the evidentiary hearing.
The substance of this process reached our desired result of separating
recoverable from non-recoverable fees for consideration by the trial court..
Id. (emphasis added). In substance, RTNC did precisely what Richards did in Brown, to
wit: (i) RTNC analyzed its counsel's billing records and eliminated from its fee claim that
portion of its effort clearly or likely expended on noncompensable issues and; (ii)
articulated in its fee application the process it followed to accomplish this segregation.
Cook claims that RTNC has repeatedly failed to respond to "this issue" and
that this supposed failure "speaks volumes" as to some unstated point. [Cook Brief p. 34]
In fact, RTNC has responded to "this issue" every time and that response has been to
decline Cook's demand for proof where neither Utah law nor the trial court required such
proof. These are but two of the reasons the evidence sought by Cook was not submitted
by RTNC.
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A third reason that RTNC did not offer the evidence demanded by Cook, in
particular the "contemporaneous" billing information, is that such information is
irrelevant in light of the evidence that RTNC did produce, to wit: the sworn testimony of
RTNC's counsel that, inter alia, he conducted a detailed review of the time charged
against the Cook file in the context of the services provided on each phase of the
litigation and the actual court records, deposition transcripts, trial transcripts, etc.
[R. 2071-2077, 2381-2414, 2194-2196] This approach, which was mandated by the trial
court, required RTNC to reorganize gross billing information into the categories
requested by the trial court and, further, to show specifically where and to what extent
RTNC's legal effort was allocated to compensable and noncompensable issues. Further
evidence was unnecessary, particularly in view of Cook's failure to offer any
controverting evidence on any aspect of RTNC's fee application and the evidence
submitted of his own fees and costs.18
Cook also claims that RTNC's fee claim is limited to whatever fee
arrangement it has with counsel, implying that that fee arrangement must be put into
evidence. [Cook Brief p. 34, n. 8] Cook is wrong. Under Utah Law, the fee arrangement
between a prevailing party and its counsel is largely irrelevant to, and, at a minimum, is
neither required nor determinative of, the fees to be awarded. See e.g., Canyon Country

18

Cook sought $195,000 in fees following trial while asserting that this
amount did not fairly reflect fair compensation for his legal effort. [R. 2099-2190, 20332040, 2106 at \ 15, 2035 at 1fs 6 and 7]
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Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989) (contingency fee agreement not
determinative of fee award where award based on contract or statute); Associated
Industrial Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984) (while evidence
of fee agreement "may be helpful... it cannot substitute for trial court's full inquiry into
the matter").
The reasons the evidence sought by Cook is not required are apparent. A
prevailing party's fee arrangement with counsel generally should not inure either to the
benefit or detriment of the losing party. Accordingly, the fee award to the prevailing
party is driven by an objective, not subjective, standard (i.e., reasonably necessary
services at market rates). See e.g., Canyon Country. 781 P.2d at 420.
Having all required evidence before it and no controverting evidence from
Cook, the trial court in its broad discretion awarded RTNC a portion of its attorney fees.
This award must be affirmed, not set aside based upon nonexistent requirements.
2.

Cook's Challenge of the Trial Court's Finding that RTNC's Fees
Were Reasonable and Necessary Fails Because Cook: (D Did Not
Apply the Appropriate Standard of Appellate Review; and fii) Did
Not Meet His Burden Under that or Any Other Applicable Standard.

Cook claims that RTNC failed to establish that the legal effort for which it
was awarded fees was reasonable and necessary. [Cook Brief pp. 35-36] He asks this
Court to review this particular component of his appeal on an "abuse of discretion"
standard [Cook Brief p. 3]. While it is true that Utah's appellate courts have generally
stated that this standard is used to review a trial court's award of attorney fees on
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appeal19, RTNC submits that Cook has mis-identified the issue he is appealing and, in the
process, failed to meet his burden under the applicable standard.
The vagaries of what appellate standards of review apply to the many
decisions trial courts make every day have resulted in much discussion amongst judges,
practitioners, and legal scholars. This debate has lead this Court to acknowledge that the
appellate standard of review to be applied to a trial court's decision is a function of
several factors, including but not limited to the specific issue the trial court is being asked
to decide, the degree of discretion if any that the law vests in the trial court on that issue,
and the nature of the attack on the decision; i.e., whether the issue turns upon the law, the
facts, or both. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994).
Pena therefore requires a closer examination of this particular component of
Cook's appeal. Cook claims that "the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel [in
support of the reasonableness and necessity of its legal effort]" consisted of statements
from its fee affidavits affirming that its effort was, inter alia, reasonable and necessary.
[Cook Brief p. 36] After acknowledging but not discussing still other evidence on the
issue, Cook nakedly concludes that the evidence submitted by RTNC "made it impossible
. . . [for anyone] to determine whether the fees were reasonable and whether they were
necessary . .." [Cook Brief p. 36]

19

See e.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
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Simply stated, Cook is not attacking the trial court's fee award, but rather a
the basis for that award, to wit: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
reasonableness and necessity of RTNC's legal effort. In view of the trial court's express
finding that "the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute this matter," [Addendum 4; Findings at ^ 23] Cook's attack is on
specific findings of the trial court.
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed on appeal under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 977-978 (Utah 1996);
but see Selvage. 910 P.2d at 1257 (trial court's findings of fact re attorney fees award are
questions of law reviewed for correctness). Under this standard, Cook is required to do
two things: (i) marshal all of the evidence which supports the trial court's findings; and
(ii) demonstrate that the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous in light of the great
weight of the evidence" or otherwise persuade the appellate court such that it is
"definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Knickerbocker. 912
P.2d at 977.
Cook has failed to meet this burden in the following particulars:
o

Cook has ignored the trial court's finding that RTNC's legal effort was reasonably
necessary to the case, as well as related findings which clearly bolster that finding,

o

Cook has failed to marshal the evidence in the record which supports the trial
court's finding. The evidence ignored by Cook included, inter alia: (i) the
evidence that the efforts of Cook's legal counsel which the trial court references
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in the very finding of fact being challenged by Cook, were comparable to the
efforts of RTNC s counsel [Addendum 4, Findings at If 23]; (ii) the general
evidence of the effort of RTNC's counsel throughout the litigation [see e.g., R.
2381-2414]; and (iii) the extensive discovery and dispositive motion practice that
occurred during the case, most of which was necessitated by Cook and won by
RTNC. [see e.g., R. 170-251,266-620, 1359-1384, 1388-1397, 1480-1496, 15351675, 1678-1745].20
o

Cook has failed to demonstrate that the evidence he failed to marshal is against the
great weight of evidence on the issue. To be sure, as Cook offered no evidence to
controvert RTNC's proof, Cook could not make this showing.

Based on the foregoing, one can not help but conclude that the trial court clearly did not
err when it found RTNC's legal effort to be reasonable and necessary. Having failed to
sustain his burden on this aspect of his appeal, Cook's appeal fails.
Assuming arguendo that the appellate standard of review for all aspects of
the RTNC fee award is an 'abuse of discretion' standard, Cook's argument still fails. As

20

Cook mischaracterizes Ex. 1 to RTNC's Supplemental Fee Affidavit as a
mere "summary." Ex. 1 does reorganize and in the process summarize the myriad time
entries of the legal personnel who worked on the case, but its also does much more.
Specifically, as contemplated by applicable rule and case law and directed by the trial
court, it: (i) allocates the efforts of 12 individuals to 11 specific aspects of the litigation;
(ii) further allocates these efforts into more than 125 entries, each of which describes the
work performed and hours spent on that work by that individual in that aspect of the
litigation, and; (iii) provides an appropriate format to delineate where and to what extent
these efforts were allocated to compensable and noncompensable issues.
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found by the trial court, RTNC's fee application contains all evidence required under
Utah law and, based upon this evidence and law, that RTNC was entitled to recover
attorney fees. Having failed to conduct any meaningful analysis of the trial court's
findings of fact, Cook has not demonstrated and can not demonstrate (as he must) that the
trial court abused its discretion in making this award. Specifically, he has failed to
demonstrate that the award "is without reasonable basis", Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993), or was "arbitrary and capricious", Kunzler v.
O'DelL 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Measured against these standards, Cook's assertion that the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings made it "impossible" for anyone to determine
whether RTNC's legal effort was reasonable or unnecessary rings hollow. Cook's two
examples in support of this argument shed no light on his concerns:
o

The first example cited is 74.3 hours of time charged for the various discovery
motions filed in the court below. Because specific dates are not given for this
time, Cook argues that it is impossible to tie this time to any particular work or
determine whether that work was reasonable and necessary. Perhaps Cook did not
look hard enough. The record reveals that there were ten such motions filed in the
court below, with RTNC prevailing on most of these motions, [see e.g., R. 170251,266-620, 1359-1384, 1388-1397, 1480-1496, 1535-1675, 1678-1745]
Knowing the exact dates this work was performed adds nothing.
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o

The second example cited by Cook is the 60 or so hours for the Felt mediation.
Were Cook's current attorney not his third attorney on the case, he would know
that the Felt mediation took place before any discovery had been conducted and
when both parties were "ramping-up" on the facts and law at issue. This, coupled
with the drafting of a position paper, etc., readily explains the effort. Clearly, the
dates this work was performed would bring nothing more to the mix.
Finally, Cook takes issue with the trial court's award of fees to RTNC for

the effort required to prove its attorney fees claim. This effort was of course necessary to
prove RTNC's case for attorney fees (a basic component of its case against Cook) and
was itself compensable under the contract.
In sum, the trial court neither 'clearly erred' not 'abused its discretion' in
finding RTNC's legal effort to be reasonable and necessary. For the above-stated
reasons, the trial court's fee award to RTNC must be affirmed.
3.

Cook's Challenge of the Trial Court's Finding that RTNC
Reasonably Allocated Its Fees to Compensable and Noncompensable
Issues Fails Because Cook: (i) Did Not Apply the Appropriate
Standard of Appellate Review: and (ii) Did Not Meet His Burden
Under that or Any Other Applicable Standard.

Cook's attack on the trial court's allocation of RTNC's legal effort to
compensable and noncompensable issues21 [Cook Brief pp. 37-40] is also an appeal from

21

"Compensable" issues are issues where attorney fees are recoverable under the
parties' contract. "Noncompensable" issues are those where attorney fees are not
compensable.
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an express finding of fact by the trial court, to wit: that RTNC's fee application
"reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorney fees between compensable and
noncompensable claims." [Addendum 4; Findings at ^ 21] As discussed in the
immediately preceding section, Cook applies the wrong standard of appellate review.
Again, the appellate standard of review when attacking the trial court's findings of fact is
the 'clearly erroneous' standard. In re Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d at 977-978. Cook again
fails to apply or meet his burden under this standard:
o

Cook has ignored the trial court's express finding that RTNC's had reasonably
allocated its legal effort between compensable and noncompensable claims, as
well as related findings which support that finding.

o

Cook has failed to marshal the evidence in the record which supports the trial
court's findings. The evidence ignored by Cook included, inter alia: (i) the
prosecution and defense of both parties' compensable and noncompensable claims
for election-phase services required proof of the same facts [R. 2385-2392]; (ii)
the election-phase of this dispute encompassed at least 80% of the relevant time
frame for the entire dispute and some 94% of each party's damage claims; (iii)
RTNC allocated some 84% of its legal effort to compensable claims and some
16% to noncompensable claims [R. 2393, 2395]; (iv) the vast majority of RTNC's
legal effort was expended on its claims for election-phase services and defending
Cook's counterclaims arising out of those same services and related billings [R
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2391 at 111]; and (v) a substantial portion of RTNC's legal effort entailed efforts
on issues that were not claim-specific, but nonetheless compensable [Id],
o

Cook failed to demonstrate that the evidence he failed to marshal is against the
great weight of evidence regarding allocation. As he offered no evidence
controverting RTNC's allocation of its effort, Cook could not make this showing.

Once again, one cannot help but conclude that the trial court clearly did not err when it
accepted RTNC's allocation of legal effort between compensable and noncompensable
claims. Having failed to sustain his burden on this aspect of his appeal, Cook's appeal
fails.
Against this backdrop, Cook's attack on the results of the trial court's
allocation fails even under an 'abuse of discretion' standard. As found by the trial court,
RTNC's fee application contains all evidence required under Utah law and, based upon
this evidence and law, the trial court awarded RTNC its attorney fees. Having failed to
conduct any meaningful analysis of the trial court's findings of fact, Cook has not
demonstrated and can not demonstrate (as he must) that the trial court abused its
discretion in making this award. Specifically, he has failed to demonstrate that the award
"is without reasonable basis", Crookston. 860 P.2d at 938, or was "arbitrary and
capricious", Kunzler. 855 P.2d at 275. For example:
o

As demonstrated in Brown, the appellate court's concern is the process used to
make this allocation, not the results; yet Cook complains only of the results,
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arguing that it is somehow evidence of a defective process. As demonstrated infra,
the process used to structure RTNC's fee application was substantively identical to
the process used in Brown, except that RTNC also analyzed its entire legal effort
in the context of what actually transpired in the court below. Having not analyzed
the process, Cook can not credibly argue that the process and resulting award has
no reasonable basis or are arbitrary and capricious.
Cook claims that the lack of "contemporaneous billing records showing the dates,
the specific descriptions of the work performed, and the time spent on a particular
task made it impossible" for anyone to analyze what fees were attributable to
compensable claims. [Cook Brief pp. 37-38] As previously demonstrated, such
evidence is not required under Utah law. See Argument III.B. 1. Further, Cook
does not explain why the lack of such information removes any reasonable basis
for the fee award or renders the award arbitrary and capricious.
Cook implies that RTNC is not entitled to recover fees for its successful defense of
the vast majority of Cook's breach of contract counterclaims. [Cook Brief p.39]
The parties' contract allows "[t]he prevailing party" to recover fees for breach of
contract claims. As RTNC prevailed on the vast majority of Cook's breach of
contract claims, RTNC was the prevailing party on those claims and is entitled to
recover its fees for that effort from Cook.
Cook argues that RTNC prevailed only on one of its nine claims, implying that it
is therefore only entitled to recover 1/9 or some comparable portion of its fees.
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[Cook Brief p. 39] This argument fails because (i) the one claim for election-phase
services that RTNC prevailed on was its claim that Cook breached the modified
Services Agreement, a compensable claim; (ii) the trial court expressly found that
the factual basis for both parties' compensable claims for election phase services
was the same; and (iii) RTNC prevailed on more than 96% of these compensable
damage claims.22
o

Cook claims that RTNC's allocations do not make sense and are arbitrary because
the percentage allocations between compensable and noncompensable issues vary
from entry-to-entry and phase-to-phase. [Cook Brief p. 39] Had he made any
effort to analyze and address the process used to reach these percentages, his
argument might be colorable. As he made no such effort, he can not credibly
argue that the process and resulting award have no reasonable basis or were
arbitrary and capricious.
In sum, regardless of whether one applies a 'clearly erroneous' or 'abuse of

discretion' standard, Cook's arguments fail. The trial court's findings regarding
allocation are clearly supported by the record and the law. Its award of fees to RTNC
must be affirmed.

22

The parties sought $473,000 total damages or set-offs on compensable claims $183,000 by RTNC and $290,000 by Cook. [See Addendum 5; Cook's Supp.
Interrogatory Answer No. 30. RTNC prevailed on all but $19,500 of this total amount, or
96%. [(473,000 - 19,500) -s- 473,000 = 0.96 or 96%]
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4.

RTNC Established That Its Counsel's Billing Rates Were Consistent
With Those Customarily Charged for Similar Services in the
Locality.

Cook argues that RTNC failed to provide evidence that the rates in its fee
application were consistent with rates customarily charged for similar services in the
locality. Once again Cook attacks an express finding of fact by the trial court
[Addendum 4; Findings at f 21] and, once again, Cook applies the wrong standard of
appellate review and fails to meet his burden under the applicable standard.
Preliminarily, Cook ignores the standard of proof applicable to this element
of RTNC's fee application. Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
required RTNC in its fee application to "affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services" (emphasis added). RTNC did this twice [R. 2382 at U 5 and
2073 at 1f 5] and the trial court so found [Addendum 4; Findings at f 22]. Cook offered
no evidence controverting RTNC's evidence regarding rates and, again, the trial court so
found. [Id]
Cook again fails to apply the 'clearly erroneous' standard in his analysis.
In this regard, Cook does not just fail to marshal this evidence in support of the trial
court's findings, he simply ignores it. He also fails to demonstrate that the evidence he
ignored is against the great weight of controverting evidence he never produced. The trial
court clearly did not err in making this finding, nor did it abuse its broad discretion in this
aspect of its award of fees to RTNC. The trial court's fee award to RTNC must be
affirmed.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FEES TO RTNC WAS
PROPER.
Having lived with this case for three years, including but not limited to

three different Cook attorneys, a two-week trial that was once continued, and multiple
dispositive motions and discovery motions, the trial court was in a particularly unique
position to assess the merit of RTNCs fee application. Its award is based upon a fee
application that fully comports with applicable law and upon express findings of fact
based on the only evidence submitted. Cook has failed to demonstrate that these findings
of fact were clearly erroneous. He has also failed to show that the trial court's award
lacks any "reasonable basis", was "arbitrary and capricious," or otherwise constitutes a
clear abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. The trial court's award of fees to Cook
must be affirmed.
IV.

COOK IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES.
Cook asserts that he was the only party to prevail on a claim for breach of

the written Services Agreement and, as such, is entitled to recover his attorney fees for
that effort. [Cook Brief p. 41] He further asserts that the trial erred in ruling that RTNC
was the only prevailing party in this litigation. This argument is without merit for several
reasons, all of which stemfromthe fact that Cook ignores what transpired in the court
below.
As previously demonstrated, Cook was not the only party to prevail on a
claim for breach of the Services Agreement. Per the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on
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its claim that Cook breached the Modified Services Agreement and received a verdict for
the full amount sought. [R. 1941-1942]
Further, RTNC was the prevailing party on the vast majority of Cook's
compensable breach of contract and other, overlapping, counterclaims. [R. 1944-1946]
In his Answer and Counterclaim, Cook alleged nine different breaches of contract on the
part of RTNC and sought damages for these alleged breaches in excess of $225,000.23
Prior to trial, RTNC secured summary judgment as to three of these alleged breaches.
[R. 1742-1745] At trial, RTNC defeated another four of these alleged breaches and part
of a fifth.24 In short, during the course of litigation RTNC defeated seven of Cook's nine
breach of contract counterclaims and part of an eighth, and disproved more than $270,000
of Cook's $290,000 in damage and set-off claims. [See n.22] Of the $19,500 set-off
obtained by Cook at trial, substantially less than one-half of that amount had actually

23

Specifically, Cook alleged that RTNC breached the Services Agreement to
Cook's damage as follows: (i) failure to retrieve campaign lawn signs after the general
election; (ii) conducting unreliable polls; (iii) misappropriating (conversion of) polling
reports; (iv) over-billing for consulting services; (v) billing for post-election consulting ;
(vi) over-billing for primary win bonus; (vii) billing for GOTV calls made by persons
other than RTNC personnel; (viii) over-charging for expenses, and; (ix) charging a
commission for political party campaign contributions. [Addendum 5; Cook's Supp.
Answers to Interrogatories at pp. 2-4] He sought set-offs of $220,000 and damages of
$70,000 for these claims.
24

The jury no-caused Cook on his claims that RTNC breached the modified
Services Agreement by over-billing for consulting services, billing for post-election
consulting services, over-billing for the primary win bonus, and billing for GOTV calls
made by persons other than RTNC personnel. It also rejected a portion of Cook's breach
of contract claim that RTNC had over-charged for expenses.
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been paid by Cook.25 Simply stated, by the time the dust had settled follow iiig ti lal,
RTNC had in terms of damages and set-offs prevailed on more than 93% of Cook's
compensable counterclaims and more than 96% of all compensable and overlapping
claims litigated below.
Because RTNC prevailed on its breach of contract claims and successfully
defended the vast majority of Cook's breach of contract counterclaims, it is the prevailing
party on these claims. As such, it is the only party entitled to recover attorney fees.
Indeed, some cases suggest that RTNC's decisive victory in (his matin subsumes its
failure to prevail on a portion of Cook's counterclaims and that RTNC is entitled to an
award of all fees incurred in this matter. See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter. 61 F.3d 1505,
1512 (10th Or. 1995); Durant v. Independent School District No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566
(10th Or. 1993).
Here, the trial court ordered RTNC to segregate, inter alia, fees it incurred
in its unsuccessful effort to eliminate the tattered remnants of Cook's compensable
counterclaims and RTNC has done so. No further adjustment, such as awarding Cook
attorney fees for securing a de minimis set-off against RTNC's decisive victory, is
warranted.
25

Trial Exhibit 153 [Addendum 3], reconciled RTNC's charges and Cook's
payments for election-phase services and served as RTNC's principal damages exhibit at
trial. Invoices appearing in bold were invoices not paid by Cook. RTNC's commission
charges of app. $11,500 for political party contributions were invoiced along with all
other PAC commissions. As Ex. 153 demonstrates, Cook failed to pay any amount on
any of the PAC invoices.
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CONCLUSION
Cook's arguments on appeal are without merit. RTNC requests that the
Court affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety. Alternatively, should the Court
reverse the trial court's judgment for principal and interest for services rendered by
RTNC, RTNC requests that the same be remanded for retrial as appropriate. Further,
should the Court reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees to RTNC for any reason,
RTNC requests that the issue of fees be remanded to the trial court for further taking of
evidence and findings by the trial court as this Court deems appropriate. RTNC further
requests attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2001.
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347903
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of March, 2001, two true and correct
copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to I he
following:
Blake S. Atkin
Jonathan L. Hawkins
Atkin & Lilja, P.C.
136 South Main, 6th floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

CCA/}
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

VL

FORM OF CONTRACT
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

^M

(»R \L MODIFK \ I ION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by oral or verbal
agreement, even though the written contract may prohibit oral or verbal modifications or
require that modifications be in writing.

c 1nn °
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f t * DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 4 2000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 970904869CV

MERRILL COOK, et al.,

Hon. Sandra Peuler

Defendants.

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
R.T. Nielson Co.'s Claims:
1.

Did the R.T. Nielson Co. and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee
modify their Services Agreement as alleged by the R.T. Nielson Co.?

Yes

5704.0001; 295170

No

If your answer to 1. is "No", go directly to 4. Do not complete 2. or 3.
If your answer to 1. is "Yes", did Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress
Committee breach their contract with the R.T. Nieison Co. as modified by failing to pay the
R.T. Nieison Co. as agreed and/or violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

Yes

V

No

If your answer to 2. is "Yes", in what amount did the breach damage the R.T. Nieison Co.?

$

/ r L, ^ F A

If you have completed this item 3., go directly to 8. Do not complete 4. through 7.

Were the infrastructure and polling services provided during the primary and general
election cycles covered by the written Services Agreement?

Yes

No

If your answer to 4. was "Yes", go directly to 8. Do not complete 5. through 7.
If your answer to 4. was "No", is the R.T. Nieison Co. entitled to recover the reasonable
value of those services from Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee
under an unjust enrichment or quantum meruit theory?

Yes

3704.0001; 295170

No
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6.

If your answer to 5. is "Yes", what is the reasonable value of the infrastructure and polling
services provided by the R.T. Nielson Co.?

$

7.

In addition to the value stated in 9., what amount is due the R.T. Nielson Co. under the
Services Agreement for unpaid fundraising, GOTV, bonus, and/or expense invoices, after
crediting payments made by Merrill Cook and/or the Merrill Cook for Congress Commitee
for primary and general cycle services and costs?

$

8.

Is the R.T. Nielson Co. entitled to recover, under an implied contract or unjust enrichment
theory, from Merrill Cook for consulting services, equipment rental, and office rental during
the post-election or transition cycle?

Yes

9.

V

No

If your answer to 8. is "No", go directly to 10. Do not complete 9.
If your answer to 8. is "Yes", what is the reasonable value of the consulting services,
equipment rental, and office rental provided by the R.T. Nielson Co. during the postelection or transition cycle?

$

//,.v-?

13704.0001; 295170
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MCC's Claims:

10.

Did the R.T. Nielson Co. have a fiduciary relationship with Merrill Cook and the Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee?

Yes

11.

No

\ /

If your answer to 10. is "No", go directly to 12. Do not complete 11.
If your answer to 10. is "Yes", did the R.T. Nielson Co. breach a fiduciary duty to Merrill
Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee as alleged by Merrill Cook and the
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee?

Yes

12.

No

Did Ronald Nielson have a fiduciary relationship with Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook
for Congress Committee?

Yes

13.

No

\y'

If your answer to 12. is "No", go directly to 14. Do not complete 13.
If your answer to 12. is "Yes", did Ronald Nielson breach a fiduciary duty to Merrill Cook
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee as alleged by Merrill Cook and the Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee?

Yes

13704.0001; 295170

No
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14.

If your answer to 11. is "Yes", did this breach invalidate the Services Agreement and any
oral modifications of the Services Agreement in their entirety.

Yes

No

If your answer to 14. Is "Yes", you can not award damages to either party on their breach of
contract claims. You may however award either party recovery under their unjust
enrichment claims.

15.

If your answers to 11. and 13. are "No", go directly to 16. Do not complete 15.
If your answer to either 11. or 13. is "Yes" and your answer to 14. Is "No", in what amount
if any did said breach damage Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee?

$

If you have completed this item 15., go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not
complete 16. through 17.

16.

Did the R.T. Nieison Co. breach the Services Agreement as alleged by Merrill Cook and the
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, including the breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing?

Yes

l/^

13704 0001, 295170

No
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17.

If your answer to 16. is "No", go directly to 18. Do not complete 17.
If your answer to 16. is "Yes'\ in what amount if any did said breach damage Merrill Cook
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee?

$

''^--^H-h

hi, •') ll

If you have completed this item 17 , go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not
complete 18. through 19.

18.

Has the R.T. Nielson Co. been unjustly enriched as alleged by Merrill Cook and the Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee?

Yes

19.

No

If your answer to 18. is "No", go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not
complete 19.
If your answer to 18. is "Yes", in what amount has the R.T. Nielson Co. been unjustly
enriched by Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee?

$

13704 0001; 295170
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VERDICT
We the jury in the above-captioned matter, find as follows:

We find in favor of the plaintiff. R.T. Nielson Co. as follows:
Item 3. - Breach of Contract (if applicable)

$

Item 6. plus Item 7. - Unjust Enrichment and
Contract Balance (if applicable)

$

Item 9. - Breach of Implied Contract or
Unjust Enrichment (if applicable)

$

TOTAL

f ~ L

.

H$

-;

e
6c V

it,

i 73

$

We find in favor of the defendants. Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, as
follows:
Item 15. - Breach of Fiduciary Duty (if applicable) $.
Item 17. - Breach of Contract (if applicable)

$_

Item 19. - Unjust Enrichment (if applicable)

$_

TOTAL

DATED this

H

day of.

irH

7 7 , -1'ft

$

kr_J_

.,

*4

- < -

Foreperson

13704.0001; 295170
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Tab 3

ACCOUNTING RUNNING BALANCE TOTAL

Pre-Convention/Convention

$

2,086

Primary Election

14,752

General Election

166,136

Post-Election

11.509

Adjustment:

(491)

(Double Billings)

TOTAL

$

193,992

PRIMARY ELECTION - ACCOUNTING

w

Jp0-May-96
1 15-May-96

Invoice
No.
96148

J I5-May«96 96150
ff 2Q.May.96

Amount
($)
8,333
8,333

I 15-May-96 ' 96151
3-Jul-96

933 !

|J^Vfay-96
||^.Jul-96

96153

251

21-May-96
||31-May-96

96154

31-May-96
6-Jun.96

96162

|

31-May-96
3-Jul-96

96163 !

J
I

7-Jun-96
3-Jul-96

96165

8,333
8,333
1,005
1,039

7.Jun-96 96166
J 20-Jun-96 1

8,333

18-Jun-96 96168
3-Jul-96 1

8,333

J

18-Jun-96
3-M-96

96169

2,178

J

24-Jun-96
|^3-Jul-96

96170

24-Jun-96
J 21.Jun-96

96171

306
579

For

8,333 j

8,333
-0-

8,3331
-0-1

140

8,333

8,333
-0- !

8,333|
-0-1

933

933
-0-

933|

196
196

251

251
-0-

2511
-0-|

8,333

8,333
-0-

8,333fl

163

8,333

8,333
-0-

8,333

167

1,005

1,005
-0-

1,005 J

196

1,039 j

1,039
-0-

1,039

196

8,333

8,333
-0-

8,333 I

182
195

8,333

8,333
-0-

8,333
-0-J

2,178

2,178
-0-

2,178

196

306

306
-0-

306

196
187

579

579
-0-

579
-0-|

203

5,000

5,000
-0-

5,000
-0-j

9,252

9,252 J

Expenses
Consulting Fee
Consulting Fee
Expenses
Expenses
Consulting Fee
Consulting Fee
Expenses
Expenses
Expenses
(Rally)

9,252
*****

GOTV
****

29.Jui.96
5-Sep-96
16.Sep.96
18-Sep-96
19-Sep-96
l-Oct-96
7-Oct-96
1 15-Oct-96

50,000

Primary
Election
Bonus*

Invoice
Running 1
Balance ($) 1 Balance (S\ |

136

Expenses

J 26-Jun-96 | 96173
******** *****

«

ffl

Consulting Fee

5,000

120,543

Amount

Consulting Fee

26.Jun-96 96172
1 7-Aug-96 1

96199

Check
No.

Bonus

-0-J

-0-J
-0-J
-0-J
-0-J
-0-J

-0-J
-0-J

***

*****

*****

*****

212
215
216
217
227
232
246

8,000
5,000
5,000
2,500
8,000
8,000
8,000

50,000
42,000
37,000
32,000
29,500
21,500
13,500
5,500

59,252
51,2521
46,252
41,252
38,752
30,752
22,752 J
14,752 J

105,791

**^*J

$14,7521

|
This $50,000 was originally billed as 'Consulting Fee for General Election' under Invoice No. 96182 (also
ed 29-Jul-96; total amount invoiced $150,000). Invoice No. 96182 was voided and split into Invoice No. 96199
($50,000 - Primary Election Bonus) and Invoice No. 96200 (for $100,000 - Consulting Fee for General Election) in
August 1996

Pate

Invoice

! 22-Feb-96
1 5-Mar-96

96113

I-Mar-96
( 5-Mar-96

96116

4-Mar-96

96118

Amount
(?)

For
.

4,999
1,285
40,000

is.Mar.96
1 fi\lar-96
J 19-Mar-96
26-Mar-96
i-Apr-96
19-Apr-96
29-Apr-96
J 7-Mar-96
8-Mar-96
J 13-Mar-96

96125

18-Mar-96
26-Mar-96
J l-Apr-96

96126

18-Mar-96
J 19-Mar-96

96127

22-Mar-96
J 26-Mar-96

96131

8-Apr-96
1 15-Apr-96

96133

I! I Apr-96 | 96134
j 15-Apr-96 i
iO-Apr-96
j 15-Apr-96

96136

1,215
12,000

1,112
2,422
1,158
4,386
423

23-Apr-96 | 96138
j 7-May-96 |

4,215

23-Apr-96 j 96139
30-Apr-96

7,175

[
Polling

3,450 j

3-May-96 ! 96142
1 7-May-96

4,407

3-May-96
j 7-May-96

96143

1

96144

4,787

j 6-May-96 j 96145

5,000

May-96

7,052 j

_H)5 2 086j

Amount

1 ($)

Convention
Management;
Room Usage
and Office
Equipment

4,999

4,999
-0-

4,99
-C

[

1,285

1,285 1
-0- i

1,28
-0

40,000 [

40,00<

8,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
8,000
2,000
6,000

32,000 '
28,000
24,000
20,000
16,000
8,000
6,000
-0-

32,00(
28,00(
24,00(
20,00(
16,00(
8,00C
6,00C
-0-

102

1,215

1,215
-0-

1,215
-0-

111
114

3,000
9,000

12,000
9,000
-0-

12,000
9,000
-0-

109

1,112

1,112
-0-

1,112
-0-

111

2,422

2,422
-0-

2,422
-0-

119

1,158 j

1,158
-0-

1,158
-0-

119

4,386

4,386
-0- !

4,386
-0423
-0-

3

2
103
109
111
115
119
123
132

1

Expenses
Voter ID.
Survey; GOTV
Expenses
Expenses
Expenses
Delegate
Poll #2

Invoice
Running
[ Balance (S) 1 Balance ($]

1l

Stationary

119

423 j

423
-0- j

132

4,215 1

4,215 j
-0-

125
132

5,000
2,175 j

129

Expenses
Expenses

4,2151
-0-

8,000 j

7,175
2,175
-0*******

(8,000) j

132

3,450 j

3,450
-0-

(4,550)
(8,000) j

4,407
132

4,407 j

(3,593)
(8,000) J

132

6,753 1

Expenses

j 2-May-96
29-Apr-96 ' 96141 '
J 7-May-96

Check
n

Expenses
Expenses
Expenses

-0- j

7,175
2,175
-0-|

7,052
299 1

(948)1
(7,701)

Expenses

4,787 1

(2,914) j

Bonus

5,000 1
103^000 |

sje sje sje J(C jfc sjc 3je

2,086 J

S2.086

V

Invoice

1 #

Amount

i

For

ia_-

f29-Jul-% [ 96184

!,«»«

| 2 9 - J u l - 9 6 1 96200
I 2i-Oct-96
I 29-Oct-96

100,000

Amount

Check
_ #

($)

Invoice
Balance ($)

1

1,838 J

1,838 1

Expenses
Consulting Fee
Gen. Election

Running 1
Balance
(S) \
|

252
263 1

101,8381
93,8381
85,838 J

100,000
92,000
84,000

8,000
8,000 J

If 12-Sep-96

96212

3,250

Expenses (DC)

3,250 J

89,088 \

|

96213

2,667

Expenses

2,667 |

9\J54|

96235

2,863

Expenses

2,863

1

1,900
-0-

94,6171
96,517
94,6171

12-Sep-96

K^-Sep-96

1,900

15-Oct-96
I 15-Oct-96

96255

1 16-Oct-96

96256

1,083

Expenses

16-Oct-96
1 16-Oct-96

96257

2,716

Expenses
(Kinko's)

J 8-Nov-96

96355

23,828

PAC

1

J 8-Nov-96 1 96356

12,319

GOTV

J 8-Nov-96 I 96357

25,000

|

8-Nov-96 J 96359

J 26-Nov-96 1

96366 J

1 26-Nov-96 1 96367

Expenses
(Gingrich)

245

i

1,900
1

1,083

95,7001

1

2,716
-0- )

98,416|
95,700 J

23,828

1

119,528 J

|

12,319

1

131,846 J

Bonus

J

25,000

1

156,846 J

2,499

Expenses

J

2,499 1

159,345 j

563

Expenses

J

563 J

159,908 j

404

PAC

1

160,312 J

248

1

2,716 J

404

J 10-Dec-96

96372

2,213

PAC

J

2,213 1

162,524 J

1 20-Jan-97

97106

2,318

PAC

1

2,318 1

164,842 j

WFeb-97

97112

1,294

EXP

1

1,294 |

166,136 J

186,752

20,616

******

1 $1664361
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rHJffl DISTRICT COURT
Third -lird^s! District

C I . 2 <: 2330
Craig C. Coburn [A0688]
Russell C. Fericks [A3793]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for R. T. Nielson Company
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Facsimile:
(801) 532-5506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
ATTORNEYS FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
MERRILL COOK, et al.,

Civil No. 970904869CV

Defendants.

Hon. Sandra N. Peuler

The Court, having reviewed and considered plaintiffs Supplemental Affidavit of
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys
Fees and Costs, and plaintiffs Reply to that Objection, makes the following findings of fact and
reaches the following conclusions of law in support of its award of attorneys fees to plaintiff:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This dispute arose out of services rendered and expenses incurred by plaintiff

R.T. Nielson Co. ("RTNC") for or on behalf defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for
Congress Committee (collectively "Cook") during and following Cook's 1996 congressional
campaign.
2.

In March 1996, RTNC and Cook entered into a written Services Agreement

whereby, inter alia, RTNC agreed to provide services for Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and
Cook agreed to pay for those services. The Services Agreement contains the contractual provision
giving rise to RTNC's claim for attorneys fees.
3.

RTNC claimed that the parties twice orally modified the Services Agreement

to expand and extend RTNC's services and that Cook failed to pay RTNC as agreed under the
modified Services Agreement. Cook denied these claims.
4.

RTNC first brought suit against Cook in January 1997. Shortly thereafter,

that suit was voluntarily dismissed by RTNC without prejudice and the parties engaged in direct
negotiations and in a mediation in an effort to resolve their dispute. These efforts failed.
5.

RTNC refiled suit against Cook in July 1997, and Cook counterclaimed.

RTNC's claims, which were plead in the alternative, included breach of contract, account stated,
and quantum meruit. Cook's counterclaims, some of which were plead in the alternative, included
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty against RTNC, and breach of
fiduciary duty against RTNC's principal agent, Ronald T. Nielson.
-2-

6.

Out of all of RTNCs and Cook's claims, only those alleging breach of the

Services Agreement, if and as modified, were ostensibly compensable with regard to attorneys fees.
7.

The parties' respective claims were based upon the same facts. Specifically,

they were based upon the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during and following
Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and Cook's payment or failure to pay for those services and
expenses. Similarly, the legal theories underlying the parties' claims were interrelated and most
claims were plead in the alternative.
8.

The relevant time period for the parties' dispute was early 1996 through

December 1996. For purposes of this discussion, this time period is comprised of two distinct
components. The first time period ("the election phase"), ranfromearly 1996 through November
5, 1996, the date of the 1996 General Election and the date upon which the Services Agreement
expired of its own accord. The second time period ("the post-election phase") ranfromNovember
6 through December, 1996.
9.

The bulk of RTNC's claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out of the

election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total relevant time period. Further,
approximately $182,000 of RTNC's total claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered
and expenses incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to Cook's
counterclaims.
10.

There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various claims

each party asserted against the other. Specifically:
-3-

a.

RTNC's alternative claims for election phase services and expenses (i.e., its

compensable breach of contract claim and its noncompensable unjust enrichment
and account stated claims) were based upon the same facts (e.g., conversations,
services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes, and other evidence
from the election phase).
b.

Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his noncompensable

claims regarding the election phase were based on these same facts.
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable and noncompensable
election phase claims required proof of what transpired during the election phase. Similarly,
RTNC's and Cook's claims related to the post-election phase (none of which were compensable)
required proof of the same facts, albeit a different set of facts than the election phase claims.
11.

As more specifically itemized in RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of

Attorneys Fees and Costs, this litigation included, inter alia, the following activities:
a.

Extensive written discovery undertaken by both RTNC and Cook;

b.

Multiple depositions, including several that lasted two or more days;

c.

Multiple discovery-related motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority

of these motions);
d.

Multiple dispositive motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority of these

motions);
e.

Multiple pretrial motions;
-4-

f.

Jury selection which, due to media interest, entailed a greater effort by the

parties (e.g., a jury questionnaire, in-chambers voir dire, larger jury pool);
g.

Ten (10) days of trial; and,

h.

Extensive post-trial proceedings, primarily with regard to attorneys fees.

12.

The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent

developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and expenses incurred during the
election phase (i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim and its overlapping but
noncompensable alternative unjust enrichment and other claims).
13.

RTNC spent a modest amount of time developing its unjust enrichment

claim for post-election services and expenses. This claim was based on a simple legal principle and
limited facts (i.e., a single invoice and limited testimony from a handful of witnesses).
14.

RTNC spent a modest amount of time prior to trial addressing Cook's

claims. Several of these claims were dismissed on summary judgment before trial. These
dismissals encompassed several elements of Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his
alternative unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and other noncompensable claims.
15.

Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claim-specific

(e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural matters and motions).
16.

The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The only claims tried to the jury

were: (i) RTNC's claim that Cook breached the modified Services Agreement; (ii) RTNC's
overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses; (iii)
-5-

RTNC's unjust enrichment claim for post-election services and expenses; (iv) the remaining
elements of Cook's claim that RTNC breached the Services Agreement; and, (v) Cook's unjust
enrichment and breach offiduciaryduty claims against RTNC and Ronald Nielson.
17.

The jury found, inter alia, that: (i) RTNC and Cook had orally modified the

Services Agreement as alleged by RTNC; (ii) Cook had breached the parties' modified contract by
failing to pay RTNC as agreed; (iii) RTNC had overcharged Cook for certain expenses; (iv) RTNC
was not entitled to a commission on funds contributed to Cook by political party committees; (iv)
Cook had been unjustly enriched by the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during
the post-election phase; and, (v) all of Cook's other counterclaims were without merit. Further,
RTNC's overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses
was eliminated as a matter of law by the jury'sfindingthat the Services Agreement had been
modified by the parties to include said services and expenses.
18.

With the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on its compensable breach of

contract claim and had successfully defended seven of the nine elements of Cook's compensable
breach of contract claims. These seven elements encompassed the vast majority of damages or setoffs sought by Cook. Further, having sought approximately $194,000 in total damages, RTNC
received a net verdict in its favor of approximately $175,000, including some $163,000 for Cook's
breach of the modified Services Agreement.
19.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court previously ruled that RTNC was the

prevailing party under applicable law and that RTNC was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys
fees from Cook for its successful prosecution or defense of compensable claims.
-6-

20.

In its August 8, 2000, Minute Entry, this Court rejected RTNC's initial fee

application and invited RTNC to supplement that application by: (i) itemizing the specific work
performed and time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual employed by RTNC's
counsel; and (ii) segregating this time and effort between compensable and noncompensable
claims.
21.

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including

specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives. Specifically, it:
a.

sets forth the legal basis for an award of attorneys fees;

b.

itemizes, identifies and describes the specific work actually performed by

each member of RTNC's legal team;
c.

sets forth the number of hours spent by each member of RTNC's legal team

in pursuing this matter;
d.

affirms that the hourly rates upon which RTNC's fee application is based

and the total fee award sought are reasonable and customary for comparable legal
services in this area;
e.

articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating and allocating

RTNC's attorneys fees between compensable and noncompensable claims; and,
f.

reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorneys fees between

compensable and noncompensable claims.
22.

Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of

Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNC's evidence of: (i) the nature,
-7-

reasonableness, and necessity of the work actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any
member of RTNC's legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the reasonableness of the fees
sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates with those customarily charged for similar legal
services in this area.
23.

Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs

and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated, high-profile, and hotly-contested
litigation, the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute this matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel through trial
and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's own fee application, comparable to the
hours and fees of Cook's counsel through trial.
24.

RTNC's reasonable attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, the date of

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, were $233,326.00.
25.

Of this amount, $195,800.93 represents reasonable attorneys fees through

said date for the successful prosecution of compensable claims in this matter, the successful
defense of compensable counterclaims in this matter, and the successful prosecution or defense of
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which overlapped factually with said
compensable claims and counterclaims.
26.

The remaining $37,525.07 represents reasonable attorneys fees for the

unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, and the successful prosecution or defense of
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noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which did not overlap factually with any of
the compensable claims or counterclaims upon which RTNC prevailed.
27.

RTNC's cost for the court-ordered mediation was $525.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs complies with

the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, with this Court's August 8,
2000, Minute Entry, and with applicable case law. It is otherwise sufficient to meet RTNC's
burden of proof in supporting its requested award.
2.

The $525.00 incurred by RTNC for the court-ordered mediation is a

recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be taxed as a cost as
against both defendants, jointly and severally.
3.

The compensable claims and counterclaims in this litigation were the

parties' respective claims that the other had breached the modified written Services Agreement.
4.

As the prevailing party, RTNC is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys

a.

successfully prosecuting or defending these compensable claims or

fees for:

counterclaims;
b.

successfully prosecuting or defending noncompensable claims or

counterclaims which overlapped factually with the aforesaid compensable claims
and counterclaims; and,
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c.

general litigation efforts not directly related to specific claim or

counterclaim.
5.

RTNC is not entitled to recover attorneys fees associated with its

unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, nor for its successful prosecution or defense
of noncompensable claims or counterclaims which did not overlap factually with compensable
claims or counterclaims upon which it prevailed.
6.

Reasonable attorneys through September 5, 2000, for successfully

prosecuting or defending the compensable claims or counterclaims and overlapping
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter were $195,800.93.
7.

RTNC is entitled to judgment for attorneys fees in said amount against both

defendants, jointly and severally, and for the damages heretofore awarded by the jury, for Rule
54(d) costs awarded by the Court, and for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by
law.
DATED this

H

day of December, 2000.
By the Court:

,,

Hpn. Sandra N. Peuler
Third Judicial District Court
Approved as to Form:

Blake S. Atkin
Jonathon L. Hawkins
Attorneys for Defendants
-10-
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Attorneys for Defendants and
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs Merrill Cook and
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
R.T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES

vs.
MERRILL COOK FOR CONGRESS
COMMITTEE, a Federal Election
Campaign Committee, and MERRILL
COOK, an individual,
Defendants.
MERRILL COOK FOR CONGRESS
COMMITTEE and MERRILL COOK,
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,

vs.
R.T. NIELSON COMPANY and RONALD
NIELSON,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

Civil No. 970904869 CV
Honorable Sandra Peuler

\

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, Merrill
Cook for Congress Committee ("Cook Committee") and Merrill Cook ("Cook"), submit
this supplemental response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories.
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
Defendants incorporate the Reservation of Rights set forth in Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories.
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Defendants incorporate the General Objections set forth in Defendants1
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: State the factual basis for the allegations contained in
the Nineteenth Defense of your Answer. In your answer to this interrogatory please:
a.

Identify each and every person who to your knowledge, information or

belief has any knowledge regarding said allegations;
b.

Identify each and every person whom you intend to call as a witness

(expert or otherwise) at trial in support of or regarding said allegations;
c.

Set forth the substance and basis of the knowledge of the individuals you

have identified in sub-parts a. and b. of this interrogatory;
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d.

Identify each and every document upon which any said individual relies to

support their knowledge or testimony or which otherwise relates to the subject
matter thereof;
e.

Identify the custodian(s) of each and every document identified in the

immediately preceding sub-interrogatory;
f.

Provide an itemized listing of any and all damages claimed.

RESPONSE: In addition to the information in defendants1 earlier response to this
interrogatory, defendants state as follows:
The Nineteenth Defense in defendants' Answer is that "[a]ny damages awarded to
plaintiff must offset by the damages to defendants."
a.-e.

Defendants incorporate their responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 28, and

72 in this supplemental response.
f.

Defendants itemize "any and all damages claimed" as follows:

Overpayments
1. Total of Invoices

$423,889.93

2. Amounts Improperly Invoiced
a. Overcharges for consulting
(Invoices 96148, 96150, 96154,
96162,96166,96168,96200,
97106)

$133,083.23

b. Overcharge for primary election
bonus
(Invoice 96199)

50,000.00

c. Overcharges for expenses,
including self-dealing

19,375.99

d. Overcharges for PAC fundraising
(Invoices 96355, 96367, 96372)

11,317.50

e. Overcharges for equipment
rental (Invoices 96143, 97106)

3,300.00

f.

1,425.45

Overcharges for office rental
(Invoice 97106)

g. Overcharges for staff time
(Invoices 96170, 96171, 96184,

880.85

96256, 96257, 96359)
h. Double charges for expenses
(Invoices 96169, 96235)

490.51

i. Overcharges for GOTV calls

Unable to calculate at this time.
$219,873.531

Subtotal:
3. Total Invoices
(Amounts Improperly Invoiced)
Legitimate Invoices

423,889.93
(219.873.53)
$204,016.40

4. Amount Paid by Cook
(Legitimate Invoices)

229,657.21
(204.016.40)

Total Damages for Overpayments

$ 25,640.81

'Also improperly charged were interest charges. See Invoice FC6. Such interest charges have no basis in
the Services Agreement or any purported oral agreements as alleged by plaintiff.
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Other Damages
1. Lost lawn signs

$ 35,000.00

2. Inadequate polling

4,600.00

3. Mass mailing through first class
mail

6,200.00

4. Misappropriation of voter,
GOTV, and volunteer
mailing and address lists
and polling reports

Unable to calculate at this time.

5. Misappropriation of contribution from
Bill Reagan

Unable to calculate at this time.

Total Other Damages
TOTAL DAMAGES

$ 45,800.00
$ 71,440.81 +

INTERROGATORY NO. 72: State the factual basis for the allegations contained in
paragraph 38 of your Counterclaim. In your answer to this interrogatory please:
a.

Identify each and every person who to your knowledge, information or belief

has any knowledge regarding said allegations;
b.

Identify each and every person whom you intend to call as a witness

(expert or otherwise) at trial in support of or regarding said allegations;
c.

Set forth the substance and basis of the knowledge of the individuals you

have identified in sub-parts a. and b. of this interrogatory;
d.

Identify each and every document upon which any said individual relies to

VERIFICATION

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ss.
Merrill Cook, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is the signer
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES; that he has read the foregoing responses; and that
to the extent of his best knowledge, information, and belief, the responses are true and
correct.

Merrill Coo)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me/this £ $ day of,

My Commission Expires:

IOTARY
Residing at

oym

'

14

MOTARY PUBLIC
UDRI DEE SNOW
7011 So. Horizon Cirde
S t f U k e City, UTB4121
My Commission Expires
March 12, 2003
STATE OF UTAH

